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This page is for CISOs, compliance officers, and security engineers evaluating Para’s security posture. It covers custody classification, regulatory implications, audit history, data handling, and the controls that underpin Para’s trust model.

Custody Classification

Para uses a 2-of-2 Multi-Party Computation (MPC) architecture where the private key is split between the user’s device and Para’s cloud hardware security modules (HSMs). The full key is never held by any single party (not Para, not the integrating application, not the user’s device alone).

Regulatory Posture

To request compliance documentation or audit reports, contact the Para team at security@getpara.com.

Security Audits

Para is SOC 2 Type II compliant and regularly undergoes system-wide audits and penetration tests covering its cryptographic implementations, infrastructure, and API surface.

Audit Scope

Audits cover the following areas:

Data Handling

Encryption

Access Control and Permissions Enforcement

Para enforces a policy-based permissions system that provides an auditable control layer between applications and user wallets:
  • Every transaction is evaluated against an approved policy server-side before it reaches the MPC signing ceremony
  • Policies are immutable; changes require publishing a new version
  • DENY rules take precedence over ALLOW rules. Default posture is deny-all
  • Users explicitly consent to permission scopes during onboarding. No silent escalation
  • Each application gets its own policy per API key. Cross-app access is scoped independently
This creates a clear audit trail: what was requested, what policy was in effect, and whether the action was allowed or denied.

Non-Custodial Risk Model

For compliance teams evaluating what risks Para’s architecture eliminates vs. what remains in the integrating team’s scope:

Compliance FAQs

No. Para holds one share of a 2-of-2 MPC key pair. A valid signature requires both shares; Para’s share alone cannot produce a signature or move funds. Para has no access to the user’s recovery secret.
An attacker who compromises Para’s infrastructure gains access to Para Shares stored in HSMs. However, these shares alone cannot produce valid signatures. The attacker would also need the user’s share (stored on-device, protected by passkey/biometrics) to sign any transaction.
Users who have exported their Para Share (via Para Connect or the Para Backup Kit) can sign transactions independently without Para’s servers. Users who have not exported can wait for service restoration; their funds remain safe and inaccessible to any party.
Yes. Para is SOC 2 Type II compliant.
Yes. Contact the Para team at security@getpara.com to request audit reports and details.

Security & Trust Model

Full overview of Para’s security architecture

Key Management

MPC implementation, DKG, hardware secure enclaves